(Editor’s note: When appropriate we will publish “hard news”. The Wall Street Journal released the story below this evening. It covers how the nuclear arsenal controlled by the North Korean dictator has grown stronger while Washington falls further behind in its quest to dismantle it. Written by Wall Street journalist Dasi Yoon, reporter in Seoul, Timothy W. Martin, Korean bureau chief, Robbie Gramer, national security reporter in Washington and Alexander Ward, national security reporter covering the White House and State Department.)
President Trump tried reaching North Korean leader Kim Jong Un last year through established phone lines and communications channels. Nobody called back.
Trump next wrote a letter, according to people familiar with the matter. The problem was getting the letter into the hands of Kim, whom the president described during his first term as more than a friend.
White House officials hatched a plan for a group to wait outside the Manhattan office of North Korea’s permanent mission to the United Nations. When a North Korean diplomat walked past, the group swooped in and thrust a letter into his hands. At a U.N. meeting, the diplomat later tossed the unopened letter in front of a U.S. representative, the people familiar said.
During Trump’s first term, the two leaders met three times, and denuclearization was at the heart of their talks. It now appears North Korea’s supreme leader isn’t interested in either giving up his nuclear arsenal or being friends with the ostensible leader of the free world.
On a trip to Asia this week, Trump’s renewed push to sit down with Kim hit a wall. The two sides explored the possibility of face-to-face talks in a last-minute scramble, but Kim set conditions the U.S. couldn’t accept, according to people familiar with the discussions.
Trump’s pursuit of a meeting and Kim’s silence follow America’s long-running failure to coax North Korea into giving up its atomic arsenal. For decades, Washington has tried talks, incentives, sanctions and isolation.
The U.S. must now contend with the prospect that North Korea’s nuclear status is irreversible. Even U.S. intelligence’s own annual threat assessment last year acknowledged that “Kim has no intention of negotiating away his strategic weapons programs.”
Since Kim last met Trump in 2019, the arsenal controlled by the 42-year-old dictator has grown from 20 to 30 nuclear warheads to an estimated 60, and its solid-fuel intercontinental ballistic missiles can reach the U.S.
Pyongyang has built a firm defense against U.S. pressure through a growing alignment with Moscow and the regime’s massive cryptocurrency thefts. Kim is now pushing for the U.S. to recognize North Korea as a nuclear power.
In a February speech, Kim said the U.S. could win a peaceful coexistence by accepting his nation’s nuclear program or face “eternal confrontation.”
Trump, weakened by a stinging Republican defeat in the midterm elections, is seeking a legacy-defining accomplishment on the global stage. Ahead of his Asia trip this past week, he pressed aides to cinch a meeting with Kim.
U.S. officials discussed proposals to lay the groundwork for a Trump-Kim meeting, including a formal end to the Korean War, which terminated in an armistice more than seven decades ago, a person familiar with the situation said. Officials also considered releasing a statement that didn’t formally recognize North Korea as a nuclear power but also didn’t call for the dismantlement of its program, the person said.
In return, the U.S. would seek nuclear and missile-testing caps. Washington could also pursue the opening of liaison offices, a steppingstone for more formal diplomatic ties.
Recognizing North Korea as a nuclear weapons state would be a significant shift in U.S. policy. Even engaging in talks with Kim without pushing for denuclearization would represent a major break with Washington’s longstanding approach and raise fears among allies in South Korea, Japan and Europe, experts said.
A Trump administration official said Saturday there have been no efforts to broker a meeting with Kim. North Korea’s mission to the U.N. couldn’t be reached for comment.
The White House has said it was committed to North Korea’s denuclearization.
Yet the administration lacks a detailed policy plan for North Korea, according to people familiar with the matter. Unlike during his first term, Trump has left vacant the special envoy role for North Korea policy. The White House’s national-security strategy last year didn’t mention North Korea, the first such omission since the end of the Cold War.
The Pentagon’s flagship policy document, the National Defense Strategy, which was released in January, said North Korea posed a “clear and present danger of nuclear attack on the American Homeland.” In a break from prior versions, it didn’t mention North Korean denuclearization.
En route to Asia last year, Trump hinted at the difficulties in contacting North Korea to explore talks. “Put out the word,” he said of his desire to sit down with Kim. “They have a lot of nuclear weapons but not a lot of telephone service.”
There was no meeting. The only advance was Trump describing North Korea as “sort of a nuclear power.”
More recently, he has posted photos of past meetings, from a time when he would speak of their “very special relationship.”
Pen pals
Over the past decades, U.S. administrations have tried to persuade North Korea to abandon its nuclear ambitions. They created special envoys and working-level groups. They tried bilateral talks. Another time, they invited other nations to join.
The U.S. looked at unilateral concessions, such as removing its tactical nuclear weapons from South Korea in 1991. A phased agreement struck in 1994 froze North Korea’s plutonium-production capabilities in exchange for aid, sanctions relief and two light-water reactors. The deal collapsed in the early 2000s after the U.S. discovered North Korea had a clandestine uranium-enrichment program.
Washington then pursued CVID, short for “Complete, Verifiable and Irreversible Dismantlement,” which called for North Korea to relinquish its nuclear program. When North Koreans sought concessions, former U.S. negotiators recalled their routine response: With denuclearization, all things are possible. Without denuclearization, nothing is possible.
Trump began his first term threatening tightened sanctions and “fire and fury.” When Kim announced preparations on Jan. 1, 2017, for his country’s first ICBM test, which put the U.S. within range for the first time, Trump said on social media, “It won’t happen!” It did. Later that year, the Kim regime conducted its sixth nuclear test.
When asked about possible negotiations with North Korea, Trump said, “It would be very easy for me to make a simple deal and claim victory. I don’t want to do that. I want them to get rid of their nukes.”
After months of trading insults, Trump and Kim met in Singapore in June 2018 for the first face-to-face talks between a sitting U.S. president and a North Korean leader. The Trump administration ditched CVID for FFVD, “final, fully verified denuclearization.”
In a joint statement, Kim reaffirmed a commitment to work toward the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. The two sides laid out a road map for further talks, though critics said at the time that it was weaker than previous pacts. Kim, who had halted tests of intercontinental ballistic missiles before the talks, also paused short-range missile tests.
In September that year, Trump said at a rally that they “fell in love.”
At a second summit in 2019, Kim offered to close some facilities at the country’s main Yongbyon nuclear complex in exchange for the removal of U.N. sanctions limiting trade. The Trump administration pushed for North Korea to freeze its nuclear and missile programs, then chart a road map to full denuclearization.
The talks failed, and Trump departed abruptly. The breakdown embarrassed Kim, who was so confident of winning concessions that he brought a TV crew to document the agreement. North Korea instead began testing short-range ballistic missiles.
The two sides tried to revive talks. Trump sent Kim a letter the North Korean leader called “excellent.” Trump called Kim’s return letter “beautiful.” In a surprise meeting months after the failed summit, the two men shook hands and spoke in the Korean Demilitarized Zone.
The reunion generated historic photographs but little else.
New friends
In 2020, the global pandemic slammed shut the door to diplomacy. The Biden administration gave low priority to North Korea, outranked by Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, war in the Middle East and the technological Cold War with China, according to people familiar with the matter.
The Biden administration also tried to write to the North Koreans through the U.N. mission in New York. Officials slid the letters under the door, some of the people familiar said. Several times, the letters were later spotted abandoned in the hallway.
With diplomacy stalled, North Korea expanded its weaponry, introducing hypersonic technology, reconnaissance satellites, underwater drones and next-generation ballistic missiles.
Until a few years ago, its nuclear program consisted largely of liquid-fuel ICBMs that had to be fueled on the launchpad, which made them vulnerable to detection and pre-emptive strikes by the U.S. or its allies. North Korea now fields solid-fuel ICBMs that can be pre-fueled and launched from vehicles.
In 2022, Kim found a new lifeline with Russia. North Korea was among the few nations to back Moscow after Russian President Vladimir Putin invaded Ukraine. Later that year, U.S. officials revealed that North Korea was shipping rockets and artillery shells to Russia.
Kim traveled to Russia’s Far East for a summit with Putin in September 2023, receiving promises of help to build satellites. By early 2024, officials in Kyiv, Washington and Seoul said North Korean short-range ballistic missiles were being fired at Ukraine. Russia that year vetoed the renewal of the U.N.’s monitoring of North Korean sanctions evasion. China abstained.
On his first trip to North Korea in more than two decades that year, Putin signed a mutual defense pact reviving Cold War-era obligations to render mutual aid if attacked. The pact paved the way for North Korea to send troops to Russia.
With China and Russia’s backing, the North Korean economy rose by 3.5% last year, marking the third year of growth above 3%, a robust pace for one of the world’s most heavily sanctioned countries.
North Korea recently staged the largest crypto heist in history, stealing more than $6 billion from the cryptocurrency exchange Binance. The U.S. later said it was able to help freeze nearly half of the take. Pyongyang is allegedly responsible for 89% of crypto hacking losses worldwide this year, compared with 15% in 2021, according to analytics firm Chainalysis.
The Kim regime has been strengthened by an apparent shift in stance by China, which had long opposed North Korea’s push to obtain nuclear weapons. More recently, Beijing has stopped making such calls, at least publicly. It has pushed instead for what it calls a “fair and impartial” approach toward peace on the Korean Peninsula, suggesting it won’t contest North Korea’s de facto nuclear status.
Russian officials have called North Korea’s nuclear weapons a reality that can’t be denied.
Meanwhile, in Washington, the attention paid to North Korea’s rising nuclear threat has about disappeared, said Victor D. Cha, who worked for George W. Bush’s National Security Council and was a negotiator in multilateral talks with North Korea during the 2000s.
“For someone like me, it’s kind of like screaming in a forest,” said Cha, who has posited that arms control should now supplant denuclearization as a starting point for talks. “Nobody is really paying attention.”
